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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
ROTH, Circuit Judge: 
 
In this en banc review, we must determine to what extent 
our earlier decision in Patriot Party of Allegheny County v. 
Allegheny County Dep't of Elections, 95 F.3d 253 (3d Cir. 
1996) (Patriot Party I), remains good law in the wake of the 
Supreme Court's decision in Timmons v. Twin Cities Area 
New Party, 117 S. Ct. 1364 (1997). In Patriot Party I, we 
held that the Pennsylvania statutes at issue, which in 
certain local elections bar cross-nomination of candidates 
by minor parties, but not by major parties, violated the 
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Patriot Party's2 right to freedom of association under the 
First and Fourteenth Amendments, as well as its right to 
equal protection of the laws under the Fourteenth 
Amendment. We now conclude that the decision in 
Timmons, in upholding a Minnesota "anti-fusion" statute 
against a First Amendment attack, does not undercut our 
equal protection analysis in Patriot Party I. We will, 
therefore, reaffirm our holding that the Pennsylvania 
statutes here, as applied to the local elections in question, 
violate the Patriot Party's right to equal protection of the 
laws. 
 
I. Background 
 
This en banc review implicates two separate but related 
cases. In both cases, the Patriot Party challenged the 
constitutionality of Pennsylvania's ban on minor party 
"cross-nominations" in certain local offices, 25 Pa. Stat. 
Ann. SS 2936(e) and 2911(e)(5), as a violation of the Patriot 
Party's right to freedom of association and its right to the 
equal protection of the laws. In essence, the challenged 
statutes prevent minor political parties from cross- 
nominating a candidate for certain local offices when that 
candidate has already been nominated for the same office 
by another political party. The major parties, however, are 
allowed to engage in cross nomination or "fusion" for those 
local offices.3 As a consequence, while Pennsylvania 
prohibits all parties from cross-nominating the same person 
for most state offices, it makes an exception in primary 
elections for five local offices,4  in which major parties are 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. By Order dated January 14, 1999, this court granted plaintiff 's 
motion to amend the caption to change the name of Patriot Party of 
Allegheny County to Reform Party of Allegheny County. In this opinion, 
we will continue to use the former appellation. 
 
3. "Fusion" is "the nomination by more than one political party of the 
same candidate for the same office in the same general election." 
Timmons, 117 S. Ct. at 1367 n.1 (citing Twin Cities Area New Party v. 
McKenna, 73 F.3d 196, 197-98 (8th Cir. 1996)). 
 
4. The five offices are "judge of a court of common pleas, the 
Philadelphia 
Municipal Court or the Traffic Court of Philadelphia, . . . school 
director 
in a district where that office is elective, or . . . justice of the 
peace." 25 
Pa. Stat. Ann. S 2870(f). 
 
                                3 
  
permitted to cross-nominate each other's candidates, but 
minor parties are prohibited from so doing.5 
 
The undisputed facts of the first case (No. 97-3359) are 
set forth in Patriot Party I, but we summarize them briefly 
here. The case stemmed from the Patriot Party's attempt to 
nominate Michael Eshenbaugh as a candidate for school 
director in Pennsylvania's North Allegheny School District 
in the November 1993 general election. This nomination 
was barred by the application of the fusion ban, because 
Eshenbaugh had already sought the nomination of both 
major parties in the May 1993 municipal primary, in which 
he had secured the nomination of the Democratic Party, 
but not of the Republican Party. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. The court in Patriot Party I explained the structure of the challenged 
statutes: 
 
        As a minor political party, the Patriot Party does not file 
       "nomination petitions" for the primary elections, as do the major 
       political parties. Instead, the Patriot Party, like other minor 
political 
       parties, must file "nomination papers" containing the number of 
       signatures specified by Pennsylvania law. 25 Pa. Stat. Ann. S 2872. 
 
        Section 2936(e) of the Pennsylvania Code prohibits the filing of a 
       nomination paper "if the candidate named therein has filed a 
       nomination petition for any public office for the ensuing primary, 
or 
       has been nominated for any such office by nomination papers 
       previously filed. . . ." Furthermore, S 2911(e)(5) requires that 
 
       [t]here shall be appended to each nomination paper ... an affidavit 
       of each candidate nominated therein, stating-- . .. (5) that his 
       name has not been presented as a candidate by nomination 
       petitions for any public office to be voted for at the ensuing 
       primary election, nor has he been nominated by any other 
       nomination papers filed for any such office. . .. 
 
        The above sections of the election code apply only to the 
       "nomination papers" filed by minor parties and not to "nomination 
       petitions" filed by the major parties participating in the 
primaries. 
       Thus, while S 2870(f) of the Pennsylvania election code expressly 
       allows the major parties to cross-nominate candidates for school 
       director, SS 2936(e) and 2911(e)(5) prevent such cross-nomination 
by 
       minor political parties. 
 
Patriot Party I, 95 F.3d at 256 n.1. 
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In February 1994, the Patriot Party filed suit for 
declaratory and injunctive relief under 42 U.S.C.S 1983 
against the Allegheny County Department of Elections and 
its director (collectively, "the Department"), alleging that the 
two relevant sections of the Pennsylvania Election Code 
violate the Patriot Party's right of free association under the 
First and Fourteenth Amendments, as well as its right to 
equal protection of the laws under the Fourteenth 
Amendment. The District Court granted summary judgment 
for the Department. On appeal, a divided panel of this court 
reversed the District Court's ruling on September 9, 1996, 
in Patriot Party I. On November 4, 1996, we denied the 
Department's petition for rehearing en banc. The 
Department did not seek a writ of certiorari. On remand, 
the District Court entered an order granting declaratory 
and injunctive relief in favor of the Patriot Party. 
 
Four months later, on April 28, 1997, the Supreme Court 
issued its decision in Timmons. As a result, on April 30, the 
Department filed a motion for relief from judgment in this 
case pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b). The District Court 
denied the requested relief. The Department appealed that 
order, and another panel of this court affirmed it in an 
opinion filed June 15, 1998 ("Patriot Party II"), which we will 
discuss further in connection with the second case. 
 
The undisputed facts of the second case (No. 96-3677) 
also involve a nomination to the office of school director in 
the North Allegheny School District. On May 13, 1995, the 
Patriot Party selected several candidates for this office, 
including Barbara Childress. On May 16, 1995, before the 
municipal primary elections, Childress perfected her 
nomination as one of the Patriot Party's candidates by filing 
nomination papers with the Department. 
 
Childress also sought the nominations of the Republican 
and Democratic parties, and in the municipal primary she 
won both of these nominations. On May 24, 1995, the 
Department informed Childress that, since she had 
previously filed nomination petitions seeking the 
nominations of the major parties, she was prohibited from 
seeking the nomination by a minor party. 
 
The Patriot Party brought an action pursuant to 42 
U.S.C. S 1983, seeking injunctive and declaratory relief, 
 
                                5 
  
alleging once again that the two pertinent sections of the 
Pennsylvania Election Code violate the Patriot Party's right 
of free association and its right to equal protection of the 
laws. The Department filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), while the Patriot Partyfiled a 
motion for summary judgment under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56. In 
October 1996 (several months before Timmons was 
decided), the District Court, relying on this Court's decision 
in Patriot Party I, granted the Patriot Party's motion for 
summary judgment, denied the Department's motion to 
dismiss, and entered an order granting the requested 
injunctive and declaratory relief. On appeal, that order was 
also affirmed in Patriot Party II. In Patriot Party II, the panel 
recognized that Patriot Party I had held that the 
Pennsylvania laws violated the equal protection rights of 
the Patriot Party. The panel concluded that it was bound by 
Patriot Party I insofar as the equal protection holding had 
not been overruled by Timmons. 
 
On June 30, 1998, the Department filed a petition for 
rehearing en banc, asking us to decide whether Patriot 
Party I (and by extension, Patriot Party II ) has been 
overruled by Timmons. On July 22, 1998, we granted the 
petition for rehearing en banc. For the reasons we set out 
below, we conclude that Patriot Party I has not been 
overruled to the extent that it held that the Patriot Party's 
right to equal protection of the laws was violated by the ban 
on minor party fusion in the local elections in question. 
 
II. Patriot Party I and Timmons 
 
To begin our discussion, it is helpful first to review the 
holdings in Patriot Party I and in Timmons. In Patriot Party 
I, a panel of this court held that 25 Pa. Stat. Ann. 
SS 2936(e) and 2911(e)(5), which prohibit minor parties, but 
not major parties, from cross-nominating candidates in 
certain local elections, violate minor parties' rights to 
freedom of association and equal protection of the laws. 
 
In its freedom of association analysis, the Patriot Party I 
panel applied the standard set forth in Supreme Court 
precedent, including Eu v. San Francisco County Democratic 
Cent. Comm., 489 U.S. 214, 222 (1989), and Anderson v. 
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Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 789 (1983). The panel reiterated 
the standard: 
 
       To determine whether a state election law violates the 
       U.S. Constitution, we first examine whether the 
       challenged law burdens rights protected by the First 
       and Fourteenth Amendments. If the law does burden 
       protected rights, we must gauge the character and 
       magnitude of the burden on the plaintiff and weigh it 
       against the importance of the interests that the state 
       proffers to justify the burden. We examine not only the 
       legitimacy and strength of the state's proffered 
       interests, but the necessity of burdening the plaintiff's 
       rights in order to protect those interests. If the burden 
       on the plaintiff's rights is severe, the state's interest 
       must be compelling and the law must be narrowly 
       tailored to serve the state's interests. 
 
Patriot Party I, 95 F.3d at 258 (citations omitted). 
 
The panel, applying the standard, concluded that the 
Pennsylvania statutes infringed upon the Patriot Party's 
right of free association in two ways: "First, the restriction 
prevents the Party from nominating the standard bearer 
who the Party thinks will `most effectively advance [its] 
program and platform.' Second, the challenged election 
laws deprive the Patriot Party of an opportunity to`fuse' its 
votes with those of a major party and thereby to make 
inroads into the political process." Id. Because the panel 
found these burdens to be severe, it held that Pennsylvania 
"must demonstrate that these laws are narrowly tailored to 
serve a compelling state interest." Id. at 264. The panel 
concluded, however, that the justifications offered by the 
Department did not meet this test. Id. Specifically, the 
Department had argued that four important state interests 
were served: "(1) preventing `sore loser' candidacies; (2) 
preventing individual candidates from `monopolizing' the 
ballot and causing voter confusion; (3) preventing a 
candidate from `bleed[ing] off votes of independent voters to 
bolster his or her major party endorsement'; and (4) 
encouraging new candidates to run as independents." Id. 
The panel examined each of these interests and found that 
they did not bear scrutiny. Id. at 264-68. 
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The panel also held that the challenged statutes violate 
minor parties' right to equal protection of the laws. The 
panel observed that the statutes facially discriminated 
between major and minor parties, and that in this respect 
the case was distinguishable from the Minnesota statutes 
the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals had considered in 
Timmons. Id. at 268. Relying on the principles and 
structure of the equal protection analysis in the Supreme 
Court's decision in Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 (1968), 
the panel examined whether the election laws created 
invidious distinctions or classifications. Patriot Party I, 95 
F.2d at 269 (citing Williams, 393 U.S. at 30). The panel 
delineated its task as follows: "we must measure the totality 
of the burden that the laws place on the voting and 
associational rights of political parties and individual voters 
against the justifications that the State offers to support 
the law." Id. (citing Williams, 393 U.S. at 34). Applying this 
analysis, the panel concluded that "Pennsylvania's decision 
to ban cross-nomination by minor parties and to allow 
cross-nomination by major parties constitutes the type of 
`invidious discrimination' prohibited by the Fourteenth 
Amendment." Id. The panel noted that, by treating minor 
and major parties differently, the statutes burdened both 
minor parties and the voters that support them. Id. The 
panel reiterated its earlier conclusion that, in the face of 
these unequal burdens, the Department had offered no 
compelling justifications. Id. ("Pennsylvania imposes these 
unequal burdens on the right to vote and the right to 
associate without protecting any significant countervailing 
state interest."). 
 
In Timmons, the Supreme Court upheld Minnesota laws 
that imposed a general ban on fusion candidacies. The 
Court applied the same test that the panel had applied in 
Patriot Party I but concluded that the Minnesota laws did 
not violate the right to freedom of association. Assessing 
the burdens placed on minor political parties' associational 
rights, the Court rejected the argument that a severe 
burden was imposed by the fact that a party might be 
prevented from nominating a particular individual as its 
standard bearer. Timmons, 117 S. Ct. at 1370 ("That a 
particular individual may not appear on the ballot as a 
particular party's candidate does not severely burden that 
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party's association rights."). The Court then rejected an 
argument that the fusion ban imposed a severe burden on 
minor parties' attempts to organize or develop political 
alliances. Id. at 1371 ("Minnesota has not directly 
precluded minor political parties from developing and 
organizing. . . . Nor has Minnesota excluded a particular 
group of citizens, or a political party, from participation in 
the election process."). In sum, the Court concluded the 
burdens on associational rights imposed by the fusion ban 
"--though not trivial--are not severe." Id. at 1372. 
 
Having determined that the burdens were not severe, the 
Court proceeded to conduct a "less exacting review," in 
which "a State's `important regulatory interests' will usually 
be enough to justify `reasonable, nondiscriminatory 
restrictions.' " Id. at 1370 (quoting Burdick v. Takushi, 504 
U.S. 428, 434 (1992) (internal quote marks omitted)). The 
Court reasoned that "the State's asserted regulatory 
interests need only be `sufficiently weighty to justify the 
limitation' imposed on the [minor party's] rights." Id. at 
1372 (quoting Norman v. Reed, 502 U.S. 279, 288-89 
(1992)). Although the Court declined to consider 
Minnesota's alleged interest in "avoiding voter confusion," 
id. at 1375 n.13, the Court concluded that the burdens 
imposed by the Minnesota's fusion ban on minor parties' 
associational rights were "justified by `correspondingly 
weighty' valid state interests in ballot integrity and political 
stability." Id. at 1375. 
 
III. The Rule 60(b)(6) Motion 
 
As a preliminary matter, we must determine if the 
District Court properly denied the Department's Fed. R. 
Civ. P. 60(b)(6) motion for relief from judgment filed in 
Eshenbaugh's case.6 The panel in Patriot Party II affirmed 
the District Court's denial of the motion. We agree. 
 
We review a district court's denial of a Rule 60(b) motion 
for abuse of discretion. Central W. Rental Co. v. Horizon 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. The Department moved for relief from judgment under Rule 60(b)(4) 
and (6), but on appeal, they have abandoned the former, opting only for 
relief under Rule 60(b)(6). 
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Leasing, 967 F.2d 832, 836 (3d Cir. 1992). An abuse of 
discretion may be found when "the district court's decision 
rests upon a clearly erroneous finding of fact, an errant 
conclusion of law or an improper application of law to fact." 
International Union, UAW v. Mack Trucks, Inc., 820 F.2d 91, 
95 (3d Cir. 1987). 
 
Relief under Rule 60(b)(6) "is available only in cases 
evidencing extraordinary circumstances." Martinez-McBean 
v. Government of Virgin Islands, 562 F.2d 908, 911 (3d Cir. 
1977) (quoting Stradley v. Cortez, 518 F.2d 488, 493 (3d 
Cir. 1975)). Furthermore, "[i]ntervening developments in the 
law by themselves rarely constitute the extraordinary 
circumstances required for relief under Rule 60(b)(6)." 
Agostini v. Felton, 117 S. Ct. 1997, 2018 (1997). As we will 
discuss below, the Supreme Court's decision in Timmons 
did not overrule the holding of the Patriot Party I panel that 
the Pennsylvania statutes at issue violate the Equal 
Protection Clause. Therefore, as the panel in Patriot Party II 
recognized, no extraordinary circumstances exist that 
would justify granting the Department's motion under Rule 
60(b)(6). 
 
Furthermore, to the extent that the Department is 
attempting to use its Rule 60(b)(6) motion as a means of 
seeking review of our decision in Patriot Party I, a Rule 
60(b)(6) motion may not be used as a substitute for an 
appeal. Martinez-McBean, 562 F.2d at 911. The Department 
chose not to petition for certiorari in the Eshenbaugh case 
even though it was on notice that the Timmons case was 
then pending before the Supreme Court. Indeed, a petition 
for certiorari might have obviated the need for this en banc 
review. The Department cannot attempt to second-guess 
that decision now with its Rule 60(b)(6) motion. 
 
For the above stated reasons, we find no abuse of 
discretion in the District Court's denial of the Rule 60(b) 
motion. The District Court properly concluded that the 
outcome in Eshenbaugh's case (No. 97-3359) could not be 
reopened for further consideration. 
 
IV. The Equal Protection Claim 
 
We turn now to the Patriot Party's motion for summary 
judgment in Childress's case (No. 96-3677), the granting of 
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which was affirmed by the panel in Patriot Party II. The 
granting of summary judgment by a district court is subject 
to plenary review. American Med. Imaging Corp. v. St. Paul 
Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 949 F.2d 690, 692 (3d Cir. 1991). 
 
The primary issue before us is whether the Patriot Party's 
equal protection claim is still viable after Timmons.7 Nothing 
in the Timmons opinion itself weakens the equal protection 
analysis of Patriot Party I, because no equal protection 
claim was asserted or considered by the Court in Timmons. 
The statutory scheme in Timmons differs from the 
Pennsylvania scheme in a manner crucial for the equal 
protection analysis. Timmons involved an across-the-board 
ban on fusion by both major and minor parties. In contrast, 
the Pennsylvania statutes involve a ban on cross- 
nomination that facially discriminates against minor parties 
by allowing major parties, but not minor parties, to cross- 
nominate in certain circumstances. The Supreme Court in 
Timmons did not hold that states can treat minor parties in 
a discriminatory way. Indeed, in discussing the test for 
deciding whether state election laws violate First and 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. We have chosen not to address whether the Supreme Court's opinion 
in Timmons eviscerates the associational rights analysis in Patriot Party 
I. In our current opinion, we hold only that 25 Pa. Stat. Ann. SS 2936(e) 
and 2911(e)(5) are unconstitutional because they violate a minor party's 
right to equal protection of the laws. Some degree of the associational 
rights analysis in Patriot Party I may remain viable because the 
Pennsylvania laws, in contrast to the Minnesota laws in Timmons, 
facially discriminate between major and minor parties, thus exacerbating 
the burdens imposed on minor parties. Because, however, our equal 
protection analysis is directed at the impact of this same discriminatory 
language, we do not go on to examine it as it applies to the right to 
freedom of association. 
 
Nevertheless, to the extent that it can be suggested that the 
associational rights analysis in Patriot Party I  may have state-wide or 
circuit-wide implications for election processes, see Patriot Party I, 95 
F.3d at 272 (Greenberg, J., dissenting) (arguing that the majority's 
approach in Patriot Party I "leads to the conclusion that Pennsylvania 
(and the other jurisdictions in this circuit) must permit cross-filing in 
all 
elections"), we note that the Timmons decision, in ruling that a generally 
applicable anti-fusion law does not unconstitutionally infringe on 
associational rights, appears indeed to foreclose such a suggestion. 
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Fourteenth Amendment associational rights, the Court 
wrote: 
 
       Regulations imposing severe burdens on plaintiffs' 
       rights must be narrowly tailored and advance a 
       compelling state interest. Lesser burdens, however, 
       trigger less exacting review, and a State's " `important 
       regulatory interests' " will usually be enough to justify 
       " `reasonable, nondiscriminatory restrictions.' " 
 
Timmons, 117 S. Ct. at 1370 (emphasis added). Thus, even 
though the Court held that the burdens posed by fusion 
bans on parties and voters are not severe, the Court still 
maintained a requirement that the restrictions be 
reasonable and nondiscriminatory. Because the 
Pennsylvania law permits fusion by major parties, but 
prohibits fusion by minor parties, it is, on its face, 
discriminatory.8 
 
Moreover, the Court in Timmons did not overrule in any 
way its decision in Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 (1968), 
on which the Patriot Party I panel relied in its equal 
protection analysis. Rather, the Court cited Williams 
favorably. See Timmons, 117 S. Ct. at 1374 (citing Williams 
for the proposition that the State interest in the stability of 
its political system "does not permit a State to completely 
insulate the two-party system from minor parties' or 
independent candidates' competition and influence"). 
 
In Williams, the Supreme Court stated at the outset: 
 
       It is true that this Court has firmly established the 
       principle that the Equal Protection Clause does not 
       make every minor difference in the application of laws 
       to different groups a violation of our Constitution. But 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. An argument could be made that the Court in Timmons did in fact give 
states permission to treat minor parties differently. For example, the 
Court wrote that "the States' interest permits them to enact reasonable 
regulations that may, in practice, favor the traditional two party 
system." 
Timmons, 117 S. Ct. at 1374. This argument is disposed of, however, by 
the recognition that there is a difference between regulations that "in 
practice" favor a two party system and those that on their face 
discriminate between major and minor parties. The Pennsylvania 
statutes discriminate on their face between major and minor parties. 
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       we have also held many times that `invidious' 
       distinctions cannot be enacted without a violation of 
       the Equal Protection Clause. 
 
Williams, 393 U.S. at 30. The Court went on to define the 
applicable test: "In determining whether or not a state law 
violates the Equal Protection Clause, we must consider the 
facts and circumstances behind the law, the interests 
which the State claims to be protecting, and the interests of 
those who are disadvantaged by the classification." Id.9 
 
As the panel in Patriot Party I explained,"[i]n Williams, 
Ohio election laws made it virtually impossible for new or 
small political parties to be placed on the state ballot for 
the selection of presidential and vice presidential 
candidates." Patriot Party I, 95 F.3d at 268 (citing Williams, 
393 U.S. at 24). "Thus, the challenged laws violated the 
constitutional guarantee of equal protection because they 
`[gave] the two old, established parties a decided advantage 
over any new parties struggling for existence and . . . 
place[d] substantially unequal burdens on both the right to 
vote and the right to associate.' " Id. (quoting Williams, 393 
U.S. at 24). The panel in Patriot Party I acknowledged that 
"[t]he restriction in Williams, which prevented minor parties 
from appearing on the ballot, was undoubtedly a more 
severe burden on the rights of minor parties than the 
restriction imposed by the state election laws in this case." 
Id. at 269. Nonetheless, the panel held that "Pennsylvania's 
decision to ban cross-nomination by minor parties and to 
allow cross-nomination by major parties constitutes the 
type of `invidious discrimination' prohibited by the 
Fourteenth Amendment." Id. We reaffirm this holding for 
the reasons set forth below. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
9. In Patriot Party I, after reciting the Williams test, the panel wrote 
that 
"our analysis of the Patriot Party's equal protection claim is similar in 
many respects to the balancing test that we applied to its free 
association claim." Patriot Party I, 95 F.3d at 269. From this, the 
Department tries to argue that if the free association claim is vitiated 
by 
Timmons, then a fortiori the equal protection claim is also vitiated. This 
argument ignores, however, the fact that the equal protection analysis is 
sufficiently different from the free association analysis so as to stand 
on 
its own. 
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The first question to be addressed in an equal protection 
challenge is what level of scrutiny we should apply in 
reviewing the challenged laws. In order to make this 
decision, we must assess the impact of the laws on the 
rights at stake. See, e.g., Illinois State Bd. of Elections v. 
Socialist Workers Party, 440 U.S. 173, 184 (1979) (holding 
that "[r]estrictions on access to the ballot burden two 
distinct and fundamental rights" and that "a State must 
establish that its classification is necessary to serve a 
compelling interest"); Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 142- 
44 (1972) (concluding that a "Texas filing-fee scheme has a 
real and appreciable impact on the exercise of the 
franchise" and that the laws must therefore be " `closely 
scrutinized' and found reasonably necessary to the 
accomplishment of legitimate state objectives in order to 
pass constitutional muster"). In Williams, for example, the 
Court began its analysis by identifying the rights burdened 
by the challenged state laws -- "the right of individuals to 
associate for the advancement of political beliefs, and the 
right of qualified voters, regardless of their political 
persuasion, to cast their votes effectively." Williams, 393 
U.S. at 30. The Court reasoned that the laws in question 
placed "substantially unequal burdens on both the right to 
vote and the right to associate." Id. at 31. The Court stated: 
"In determining whether the State has power to place such 
unequal burdens on minority groups where rights of this 
kind are at stake, the decisions of this Court have 
consistently held that `only a compelling state interest in 
the regulation of a subject within the State's constitutional 
power to regulate can justify limiting First Amendment 
freedoms.' " Id. (citing NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438 
(1963)). 
 
In the instant case, therefore, we must identify the 
burdens imposed by the Pennsylvania laws. In Patriot Party 
I, the panel, in its equal protection analysis, identified the 
following burdens: First, the ban on minor party cross- 
nomination "burdens individuals who support a minor 
party's platform because it forces them to choose among 
three unsatisfactory alternatives: `wasting' a vote on a 
minor party candidate with little chance of winning, voting 
for a second-choice major party candidate, and not voting 
at all." Patriot Party I, 95 F.3d at 269. Second, the ban 
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burdens the political parties themselves because they "may 
prohibit a minor party from nominating its best candidate 
and from forming a critical type of consensual political 
alliance that would help it build support in the community. 
Thus, the challenged laws help to entrench the decided 
organizational advantage that the major parties hold over 
new parties struggling for existence." Id. 
 
The Court in Timmons addressed similar burdens (in its 
associational rights analysis) in the context of a general ban 
on fusion and concluded that the burdens, although not 
trivial, were not severe. Timmons, 117 S. Ct. at 1370-72. 
The Court then proceeded to apply not strict scrutiny, but 
an intermediate level of scrutiny, in which "the State's 
asserted regulatory interests need only be `sufficiently 
weighty to justify the limitation' imposed on the[minor 
party's] rights." Id. at 1372 (citing Norman, 502 U.S. at 288- 
89). Under this standard, the Court indicated that it would 
not "require elaborate, empirical verifications of the 
weightiness of the State's asserted justifications." Id. (citing 
Munro v. Socialist Workers Party, 479 U.S. 189, 195-96 
(1986)). 
 
If we assume, and we believe we must, that the above 
stated burdens require the same level of scrutiny in an 
equal protection analysis that they do in an associational 
rights analysis, then we must now apply an intermediate 
level of scrutiny. In doing so, we will recognize, however, 
that because of the discriminatory aspects of the 
Pennsylvania statutes, the burdens imposed by them on 
voters and on political parties are more onerous than those 
involved in Timmons. In Timmons, the asserted burdens 
existed in the context of an across-the-board ban on fusion. 
Timmons, 117 S. Ct. at 1370 (noting that the Minnesota 
ban, "which applies to major and minor parties alike, 
simply precludes one party's candidate from appearing on 
the ballot, as that party's candidate, if already nominated 
by another party"). In the instant case, the burden is 
exacerbated because Pennsylvania has allowed the major 
parties to cross-nominate but has disallowed minor parties 
from doing the same. As the panel in Patriot Party I wrote: 
 
       The ill effects of these laws are further magnified when 
       the major parties elect to cross-nominate the same 
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       candidate, as they did in the school board election at 
       issue. When the major parties cross-nominate a 
       candidate, a minor party candidate must fight an 
       uphill election battle against the combined strength of 
       two well-organized and established major parties 
       without even the prospect of forming its own ballots 
       alliances. If a vote is "wasted" when it is cast for a 
       minor party candidate running against two major party 
       candidates, it is a fortiori wasted when the major 
       parties unite behind one candidate. 
 
Patriot Party I, 95 F.3d at 269. 
 
Using an intermediate level of scrutiny, our next step is 
to weigh, against the burdens imposed, any plausible 
justification the State has advanced for imposing unequal 
burdens on major and minor parties. Cf. Romer v. Evans, 
517 U.S. 620, 632 (1996) ("[E]ven in the ordinary equal 
protection case calling for the most deferential of standards, 
we insist on knowing the relation between the classification 
adopted and the object to be attained."). Wefind no such 
justification. Although the Department has identified 
justifications, such as preventing ballot manipulation and 
preserving political stability, that were recognized in 
Timmons to be legitimate state interests, see Timmons, 117 
S.Ct. at 1373-74, the Department has not demonstrated 
how these interests are served by the unequal burden 
imposed here. Indeed, the Department acknowledges in its 
brief that it has no idea why the Pennsylvania legislature 
chose to allow major party cross-nomination in thefive 
local elections at issue here, but denied the same 
opportunity to minor parties. Department Br. at 17. 10 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
10. The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania has also declined to assert any 
interests to justify this discrimination. We note that, in both 
Eshenbaugh's and Childress's case, the District Court served the 
requisite notice on the Attorney General of Pennsylvania, advising that 
the cases challenged the state laws in question, thus giving the 
Commonwealth an opportunity to intervene to defend them. See 28 
U.S.C. S 2403(b). In addition, the Attorney General was invited by this 
Court to submit an amicus brief to supplement the Department's defense 
of the statutory scheme in this appeal. In each instance, including this 
appeal, the Attorney General chose not to intervene or defend the 
constitutionality of the challenged laws. 
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As the panel in Patriot Party I explained, "Pennsylvania 
imposes these unequal burdens on the right to vote and the 
right to associate without protecting any significant 
countervailing state interest." Patriot Party I, 95 F.3d at 
269. In the context of the equal protection claim, 
Pennsylvania has not asserted any regulatory interests that 
are "sufficiently weighty" to justify the discriminatory 
treatment of major and minor parties. 
 
When we consider constitutional challenges to specific 
provisions of a State's election laws, we cannot speculate 
about possible justifications for those provisions. The court 
"must identify and evaluate the precise interests put 
forward by the State as justifications for the burden 
imposed by its rule." Anderson, 460 U.S. at 789; cf. 
Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 768 (1993) (observing that, 
unlike rational basis review, the intermediate standard of 
review applicable in commercial speech cases "does not 
permit [the Court] to supplant the precise interests put 
forward by the State with other suppositions"). 
Furthermore, our analysis is confined to the four state 
interests asserted by the Department to the District Court.11 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
11. At oral argument, the Department asserted, for the first time, that 
allowing major party cross-nomination for the five local offices served a 
state interest in making those offices nonpartisan or less partisan. The 
Department's failure to raise this argument in its appeal briefs, as well 
as before the District Court, would alone be fatal for the argument. "An 
issue is waived unless a party raises it in its opening brief, and for 
those 
purposes `a passing reference to an issue . . . will not suffice to bring 
that issue before this court.' " Laborers' Int'l Union v. Foster Wheeler 
Corp., 26 F.3d 375, 398 (3d Cir. 1994) (quoting Simmons v. City of 
Philadelphia, 947 F.2d 1042, 1066 (3d Cir. 1991) (plurality opinion) 
(Becker, J.)). Even if we were to consider this state interest, however, 
it 
does not persuade us, because the Department fails to explain why the 
interest requires or allows for discrimination against minor parties. 
 
In addition, the Department, following the dissent in Patriot Party I, 
now tries to assert a state interest in ensuring that partisan voters who 
wish to vote for a "pure" Democrat or Republican know at the time of the 
major party primary whether the major party candidate will accept a 
minor party cross-nomination. The Department, however, in arguing this 
case before the Patriot Party I panel, "never asserted that the 
Commonwealth had any such interest in protecting partisan voters, even 
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"It is well established that failure to raise an issue in the 
district court constitutes a waiver of the argument." 
Brenner v. Local 514, United Bhd. of Carpenters, 927 F.2d 
1283, 1298 (3d Cir. 1991). 
 
As summarized in Patriot Party I, the Department 
advanced four state interests to the District Court: "(1) 
preventing `sore loser' candidacies; (2) preventing individual 
candidates from `monopolizing' the ballot and causing voter 
confusion; (3) preventing a candidate from `bleed[ing] off 
votes of independent voters to bolster his or her major party 
endorsement'; and (4) encouraging new candidates to run 
as independents." Patriot Party I, 95 F.3d at 264. With 
respect to all four purported state interests, no effort is 
made by the state to show why those interests justify 
permitting the major parties to cross-nominate, while 
forbidding the minor parties from doing so. While such 
interests may be sufficiently weighty in light of Timmons to 
justify a general ban on fusion, they are not sufficiently 
weighty to justify a ban that discriminates between major 
and minor parties. 
 
First, the sore loser justification is insufficient to satisfy 
the applicable level of intermediate scrutiny. As the panel 
explained in Patriot Party I, sore losers"are candidates who 
lose a major party primary but insist on running on a 
minor party ticket in the general election." Id. at 265. 
Another panel of this court recently recognized that sore 
loser and disaffiliation laws have been upheld. Council of 
Alternative Political Parties v. Hooks, 121 F.3d 876, 881 (3d 
Cir. 1997) (citing Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724 (1974)).12 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
after it was suggested as a possibility at oral argument." Patriot Party 
I, 
95 F.3d at 264 n.6. The panel concluded that, "[b]ecause the 
Department has shown no interest in pursuing this line of argument, we 
will not dwell on it in this opinion." Id. Even if we were to consider the 
Department's latest reversal of position, we would not find this state 
interest persuasive. Once again, the Department does not explain why a 
voter's alleged interest in knowing which "pure" candidates will refuse a 
cross-nomination justifies discrimination against minor parties. 
 
12. The Court in Timmons relied on Storer, in which the Court "upheld 
a California statute that denied ballot positions to independent 
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The panel in Hooks, however, rejected New Jersey's attempt 
to justify early filing deadlines on the grounds that they 
prevented sore loser candidacies, stating that "they are 
both too broad . . . and too narrow." Id. (citing Anderson, 
460 U.S. at 805 & n.31). Similarly, the Pennsylvania laws 
at issue here cannot be justified as preventing sore loser 
candidacies because they are too broad and too narrow. As 
the panel noted in Patriot Party I, the Pennsylvania laws 
only "prevent sore loser candidacies insofar as they prevent 
a candidate who failed to win either major party primary 
from running as a minor party candidate in the general 
election." Patriot Party I, 95 F.3d at 165. The laws are too 
broad, however, because they bar a third party from 
nominating a candidate such as Ms. Childress even though 
she did not lose either primary race and was thus not a 
sore loser. They are too narrow because they do not prevent 
candidates like Mr. Eshenbaugh from continuing on as the 
Democratic candidate even though he had lost the 
Republican primary. 
 
Next, the Department asserts a state interest in 
preventing voter confusion and ballot clogging caused by 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
candidates who had voted in the immediately preceding primary 
elections or had a registered party affiliation at any time during the 
year 
before the same primary elections." Timmons, 117 S. Ct. at 1374 (citing 
Storer, 415 U.S. at 728). The disaffiliation provision in Storer, however, 
differs from the Pennsylvania laws in at least one crucial respect. The 
Court in Timmons noted that in Storer , the challenged law "did not 
discriminate against independent candidates." Timmons, 117 S. Ct. at 
1374 (citing Storer, 415 U.S. at 734). Indeed, in describing the 
California 
statute, the Court in Storer observed that, apart from the fact that an 
independent candidate needed to "qualify for the ballot by demonstrating 
substantial public support" in some other way than standing for a 
primary election, "the qualifications required of the independent 
candidate are very similar to, or identical with, those imposed on party 
candidates." Storer, 415 U.S. at 733. 
 
Similarly, the Court in Timmons quoted from its decision in Burdick v. 
Takushi, in saying that " `we have repeatedly upheld reasonable, 
politically neutral regulations that have the effect of channeling 
expressive activit[ies] at the polls.' " Timmons, 117 S. Ct. at 1375 
(quoting Burdick, 504 U.S. at 437-38). Because the Pennsylvania laws 
discriminate against minor parties, they are not politically neutral. 
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the monopolization of the ballot by minor candidates and 
the proliferation of parties. The Department, however, does 
not explain why minor parties can be prevented from 
monopolizing the ballot and causing voter confusion when 
the major parties are allowed to do so through major party 
cross-nomination. In upholding Minnesota's general fusion 
ban, the Court in Timmons specifically disclaimed reliance 
on the state's alleged interest in avoiding voter confusion. 
Timmons, 117 S. Ct. at 1375 n.13. This asserted interest 
carries even less weight here. Indeed, the fact that the 
Pennsylvania laws discriminate between major and minor 
parties undermines this asserted interest, because major 
party cross-nomination (which is allowed) would seem to 
pose just as large a risk of voter confusion. Moreover, as 
the panel observed in Patriot Party I, "the Department has 
presented no evidence to indicate that fusion is likely to 
produce a crippling proliferation of minor parties. . . . 
Furthermore, Pennsylvania retains the authority to set 
reasonable threshold requirements for parties seeking 
admission to the ballot." Patriot Party I, 95 F.3d at 266. 
 
The Department also asserts that allowing cross- 
nomination by minor candidates will allow a candidate to 
bleed off votes of independent voters to bolster his or her 
major party endorsement. This state interest was not raised 
in the Timmons case, and we reject it here. As the panel 
pointed out in Patriot Party I, "[c]ross nomination will not 
increase a major party's share of minor party votes unless 
the minor party voluntarily nominates the major party 
candidate as its own." Id. at 267. Indeed, allowing the 
major parties to cross-nominate may actually serve to bleed 
off minor party votes, as an individual who supports a 
minor party's platform but does not want to waste a vote on 
a minor candidate may cast a ballot instead on a candidate 
who has been nominated by both major parties. Once 
again, the fact that major parties are allowed to cross- 
nominate undermines this proffered state interest. 
 
Finally, the argument that the laws serve an interest in 
encouraging new candidates to run as independents is also 
undermined by the fact that major parties may cross- 
nominate. "If the Commonwealth bans cross-nomination by 
minor parties to encourage new candidates for office, it 
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should logically prohibit cross-nomination by major parties 
for the same reason. An across-the-board ban on cross- 
nomination would require the major parties to nominate 
their own candidates, thus increasing the number of 
candidates in the field and the level of electoral 
competition." Id. If anything, the current statutory scheme 
may discourage independent candidates. A three-way race 
against two major party candidates would be formidable 
enough for an independent candidate. An independent 
candidate would face an even greater challenge running 
against a candidate nominated by both major parties. 
 
In sum, we find unpersuasive each of the interests that 
the Department has offered in support of Pennsylvania's 
discriminatory statutory scheme. The fact that 
Pennsylvania allows major parties to engage in cross- 
nomination in certain local elections, but forbids minor 
parties from so doing, constitutes "invidious discrimination" 
in violation of minor parties' right to equal protection of the 
laws. The facially discriminatory nature of the laws imposes 
a heavier burden on minor parties than a general fusion 
ban of the type considered in Timmons. Moreover, unlike 
the Timmons case, the Department in this case has offered 
no "important" or "sufficiently weighty" state interests that 
justify, even under intermediate scrutiny, the 
discriminatory burdens imposed on minor parties. 
 
V. Conclusion 
 
We reaffirm the holding of the Patriot Party I panel that 
25 Pa. Stat. Ann. SS 2936(e) and 2911(e)(5) violate the 
Patriot Party's right to equal protection of the laws by 
banning cross-nomination of candidates by minor parties in 
certain local elections. Therefore, we will affirm the orders 
of the District Court denying Rule 60(b) relief in 
Eshenbaugh's case (No. 97-3359) and granting summary 
judgment for the Patriot Party in Childress's case (No. 96- 
3677). The injunction of the District Court, as it appears in 
Paragraph 4 of the District Court's Order of December 9, 
1996, is affirmed as written. However, because we affirm 
only on equal protection grounds, we will remand the 
Childress case with instructions that the District Court 
delete from Paragraph 3 of that Order the phrase"to free 
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association under the First and Fourteenth Amendments of 
the Constitution, and".13 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
13. Paragraphs 3 and 4 of the District Court Order of December 9, 1996 
state: 
 
3. Article IX, Sections 951(e)(5) and 976(e) of the Act of June 3, 1937, 
P.L. 1933, Pennsylvania Election Code, (the code) 25 P.S. SS2911(e)(5) 
and 2936(e) (Sections 2911(e)(5) and 2936(e)) are declared to be an 
unconstitutional burden on the right of plaintiff, the Patriot Party of 
Allegheny County, to free association under the First and Fourteenth 
Amendments of the Constitution, and to equal protection of the law 
under the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution insofar as they 
prohibit plaintiff, a minor political party, from nominating any person as 
a Patriot Party candidate for any office referred to in Section 2870(f) of 
the Code, 25 P.S. S2870(f), because such person is also a major party 
candidate for that office. 
 
4. Defendants are hereby enjoined from enforcing the provisions of 
Sections 2911(e)(5) and 2963(e) of the Code to prevent a minor political 
party from nominating a candidate for any office referred to in Section 
2870(f) of the Code because that candidate files a petition for a major 
party nomination to that office or is nominated as a candidate for that 
office in the primary election of a major party. 
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McKEE, Circuit Judge, concurring: 
 
I concur fully with the majority's holding that the 
Supreme Court's decision in Timmons v. Twin Cities Area 
New Party does not affect this Court's review of 
Pennsylvania's discriminatory anti-fusion laws under the 
Equal Protection Clause. I further concur in the majority's 
conclusion that the anti-fusion laws at issue here violate 
the Equal Protection Clause. I believe, however, that, under 
the Equal Protection Clause, when a law both discriminates 
and burdens a fundamental right, strict scrutiny, rather 
than intermediate scrutiny, applies. See Clark v. Jeter, 486 
U.S. 456, 461 (1988) ("Classifications based on race or 
national origin and classifications affecting fundamental 
rights are given the most exacting scrutiny.") (internal 
quotations omitted); Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1, 10 
(1992) (discriminatory statutes that interfere with a 
fundamental right are subject to strict judicial scrutiny); 
Kadrmas v. Dickinson Public Schools, 487 U.S. 450, 457-58 
(1988) (same). 
 
The classification here must be narrowly tailored to serve 
a compelling State interest to survive an Equal Protection 
challenge. Indeed, the Supreme Court repeatedly has 
applied precisely this standard to review ballot restrictions 
which disparately infringe upon First Amendment 
associational rights. See, e.g., William v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 
23, 31 (1968) (In reviewing a ballot restriction applicable 
only to minor parties, the Court stated: "In determining 
whether the State has power to place such unequal 
burdens on a minority group where [associational rights] 
are at stake, the decisions of this Court have consistently 
held that `only a compelling state interest in the regulation 
of a subject within the State's constitutional power to 
regulate can justify limiting First Amendment freedoms.' ") 
(quoting NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963)); American 
Party of Texas v. White, 415 U.S. 767, 780 (1974) ("We 
agree with the District Court that whether the qualifications 
for ballot position are viewed as substantial burdens on the 
right to associate or as discriminations against parties not 
polling 2% of the last election vote, their validity depends 
upon whether they are necessary to further compelling 
state interests," which cannot be served "equally well in 
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significantly less burdensome ways."); Storer v. Brown, 415 
U.S. 724, 729 (1974) (applying Williams v. Rhodes strict 
scrutiny to review ballot restrictions on independent 
candidates); Illinois State Bd. of Elec. v. Socialist Workers, 
440 U.S. 173, 184-86 (1979) (applying strict scrutiny 
standard to review disparate nominating requirements); see 
also, e.g., Harper v. Virginia State Bd. of Elec., 383 U.S. 
663, 670 (1966) ("close scrutiny" applied to poll tax, which 
discriminates on the basis of wealth, because fundamental 
right infringed); Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 142-44 
(1972) (applying Harper standard to filing fee system). 
 
As the Supreme Court recognized in Timmons, anti-fusion 
laws, like the ones at issue here, burden First and 
Fourteenth Amendment associational rights. Timmons, 520 
U.S. 351, 357-58 (1997); see also Munro v. Socialist 
Workers Party, 479 U.S. 189, 193 (1986) (recognizing that 
balloting and eligibility requirements for minority party 
candidates impinge fundamental associational rights); 
Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 786-87 (1983) 
(same); Williams, 393 U.S. at 30-31 (same). In determining 
whether the burdens actually violated the First 
Amendment, the Court stated: 
 
       Regulations imposing severe burdens on plaintiffs' 
       rights must be narrowly tailored and advance a 
       compelling state interest. Lesser burdens, however, 
       trigger less exacting review, and a State's `important 
       regulatory interests' will usually be enough to justify 
       `reasonable, nondiscriminatory restrictions.' 
 
Timmons, 520 U.S. at 358 (emphasis added). Thus, the 
Court's decision in Timmons to apply a less exacting 
standard of review was premised on the fact that the 
Minnesota anti-fusion laws were nondiscriminatory. That is 
not our case: Pennsylvania's anti-fusion laws discriminate 
between major parties and minor parties. Therefore, even 
assuming that the standard used in Timmons applies in the 
First Amendment context, I doubt its application in the 
Equal Protection context. 
 
Thus, because the Pennsylvania anti-fusion laws are both 
discriminatory and burden a fundamental right, I believe 
that under established Equal Protection doctrine we must 
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strictly scrutinize Pennsylvania's discriminatory treatment 
of minority party candidates under the anti-fusion laws. 
Because I agree with the majority's conclusion that the 
ballot restrictions do not pass constitutional muster even 
under the less exacting scrutiny applied by the majority, it 
necessarily follows that they do not pass muster under the 
heightened scrutiny standard that I advocate. Accordingly, 
I concur in the majority's result. 
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GREENBERG, Circuit Judge, concurring and dissenting: 
 
I concur and join in the court's opinion denying the 
Department's motion under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6). I add 
the following comments, however, with regard to that 
motion. By the time of our decision in Patriot Party I on 
September 9, 1996, the Supreme Court had granted 
certiorari in Twin Cities Area New Party v. McKenna,, 73 
F.3d 196 (8th Cir. 1996). See McKenna v. Twin Cities Area 
New Party, 517 U.S. 1219, 116 S.Ct. 1846 (1996). Thus, 
the Department had every reason to believe that the 
Supreme Court would review at least a portion of the theory 
underlying our opinion in Patriot Party I. Moreover, I 
dissented in Patriot Party I. See Patriot Party v. Allegheny 
County Dep't of Elections, 95 F.3d 253, 270 (3d Cir. 1996). 
Nevertheless, in the face of these encouraging signs, the 
Department chose not to seek certiorari in Patriot Party I. 
Therefore, it would be difficult to justify granting the Rule 
60(b)(6) motion. Moreover, even though this case has 
ramifications going beyond the interests of the parties, in 
view of the court's decision in No. 96-3677, Childress's 
case, with respect to the equal protection claim, the 
Department cannot obtain effective relief on the merits in 
No. 97-3359. 
 
While I join in the result in No. 96-3677, with respect to 
Childress, the opinion plainly goes too far and thus I must 
dissent from it. In dissenting in Patriot Party I, I made the 
following point: 
 
       I recognize that it reasonably could be argued that 
       Pennsylvania could avoid the problem I identify by 
       requiring minor parties to select their candidates prior 
       to the primary election. Of course, such a condition 
       would restrict the minor party's flexibility and would 
       have problems of its own. In any event, the possibility 
       that a minor party could designate its candidate before 
       the major party primary election does not affect my 
       analysis. Rather, I take this case as it has been 
       presented by the parties to this appeal and on the 
       basis on which the majority decides it, which is 
       whether the Pennsylvania statutes are unconstitutional 
       `as applied in this case.' Thus, I do not address the 
       possibility that the Pennsylvania statutes might be 
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       unconstitutional if applied in a situation in which the 
       minor party files its nominating papers before the 
       primary for, even if they would be unconstitutional in 
       that circumstance, they validly can be applied here. 
       See Commonwealth v. The First School, 471 Pa. 471, 
       370 A.2d 702, 705-07 (1977). Here the Patriot Party 
       nominated Eshenbaugh after the primary, and he 
       accepted its nomination at that time, and both the 
       district court and the majority adjudicated the case on 
       that basis and so do I. 
 
Patriot Party I, 95 F.3d at 271. 
 
The circumstances I contemplated in Patriot Party I that 
might arise in fact came to pass in Childress's case 
because, as the majority points out, Childress "perfected 
her nomination as one of the Patriot Party's candidates by 
filing nomination papers with the Department" on May 16, 
1995, "before the municipal primary elections." Majority 
Op. at 5. Accordingly, the question for the court to resolve 
in No. 96-3677 should not be whether 25 Pa. Stat. Ann. 
SS 2936(e) and 2911(e)(5) are unconstitutional as violating a 
minor party's right to equal protection of the laws. Rather, 
the question should be whether the statutes are 
unconstitutional as violating a minor party's right to equal 
protection of the law when its candidate declares her intent 
to cross-file before a primary election. Indeed, the Patriot 
Party itself well understands this point because in its brief 
in No. 96-3677 it explains that "[t]he present case (Patriot 
II) was also filed as an `as applied' challenge after the 
County refused to permit the Party [to] nominate another 
candidate (Barbara Childress) in the 1995 municipal 
election cycle." Br. at 5 (emphasis added). 
 
I will accept the result that the statutes in issue are 
unconstitutional when applied to a minor party candidate, 
such as Childress, cross-filing before the primaries, 
because a candidate by cross-filing before the primary 
election may seek both major parties' nominations. But 
sections 2936(e) and 2911(e)(5) surely are not 
unconstitutional if applied in circumstances paralleling 
those in Eshenbaugh's case in Patriot Party I, because there 
the candidate was seeking to cross-file at a time when the 
major parties had selected their candidates at the primaries 
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and thus could no longer nominate cross-filing candidates. 
It therefore follows that applying sections 2936(e) and 
2911(e)(5) only when a candidate seeks to cross-file after a 
primary treats a minor party exactly the same as the major 
parties. Consequently, there simply cannot be an equal 
protection problem in those circumstances, as the statutes 
do not place unequal burdens on minor and major parties. 
Thus, the Department need not demonstrate any interest to 
justify discriminatory treatment of major and minor parties, 
as there is no discriminatory treatment to justify. 
Accordingly, in declaring sections 2936(e) and 2911(e)(5) 
unconstitutional without regard for when the candidate 
cross-files, the majority goes too far. 
 
I close by making one more point. A court sometimes 
must declare a state statute unconstitutional. Nevertheless 
should we not, as a federal court, be restrained in taking 
such action? The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in 
Commonwealth v. The First School, 370 A.2d 702, 705-07 
(Pa. 1977), made it clear that if a statute can be applied 
constitutionally in some situations then a court should so 
apply it. After all, 1 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. S 1925 (1995) 
(emphasis added) provides: 
 
        The provisions of every statute shall be severable. If 
       any provision of any statute or the application thereof to 
       any person or circumstance is held invalid, the 
       remainder of the statute, and the application of such 
       provision to other persons or circumstances, shall not be 
       affected thereby, unless the court finds that the valid 
       provisions of the statute are so essentially and 
       inseparably connected with, and so depend upon, the 
       void provision or application, that it cannot be 
       presumed the General Assembly would have enacted 
       the remaining valid provisions without the void one; or 
       unless the court finds that the remaining valid 
       provisions, standing alone, are incomplete and are 
       incapable of being executed in accordance with the 
       legislative intent. 
 
We should follow First School and apply section 1925 here 
because it is clear that the statutes easily can be applied 
constitutionally to a minor party's cross-filing after the 
primary. Moreover, can anyone really believe that the 
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Legislature would not want sections 2936(e) and 2911(e)(5) 
applied to minor party candidates filing after the primary 
merely because they cannot be applied to those filing 
earlier? Surely, the Legislature would want the statutes 
applied so far as is possible. 
 
The majority indicates that "[b]ecause the Pennsylvania 
law permits fusion by major parties, but prohibits fusion by 
minor parties, it is, on its face, discriminatory." Maj. Op. at 
12. A proper respect for judicial restraint should lead us to 
the result that the discrimination be eliminated by allowing 
the minor parties to fuse their candidates with the major 
parties' candidates when the major parties' candidates can 
fuse with each other. Instead, the majority creates a new 
type of discrimination, as it allows a minor party to fuse its 
candidates with those of a major party when the major 
parties' candidates cannot fuse. Thus, I dissent. 
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